

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MANAMA 02022 01 OF 02 021451Z

44

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 085358

R 020837Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN

TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 3902

INFO JCS WASHINGTON DC

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

COMIDEASTFOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA SECTION 1 OF 2 2022/1

EXDIS (MILITARY ADDRESSES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR, MASS, MARR, BA

SUBJECT : DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM: DEFENSE MINISTER'S VIEWS

REF : MANAMA 1973

1. SUMMARY. DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS SURVEY TEAM COMPLETED ITS WORK AND HELD EXIT BRIEFING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER AND SENIOR BDF OFFICERS NOV. 30. TEAM DEPARTS BAHRAIN DEC. 2. SURVEY APPARENTLY WENT WELL, WITH FULL AND CANDID BDF COOPERATION. DURING FAREWELL CALL, DEFENSE MINISTER/HEIR APPARENT SHAIKH HAMAD EXPRESSED TO TEAM LEADER AND AMBASSADOR TWO CONCERNS ABOUT SURVEY TEAM'S REPORT: THAT IT CONTAIN STRICTLY PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JUDGMENTS, NO "POLITIC", AND THAT IT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN SUPPORT OF HIS WISH TO HAVE REPORT SOON -- HE CLEARLY HOPES TO USE IT AS BLUEPRINT FOR BDF'S FUTURE AND AS BASIS FOR FUND-RAISING EFFORTS -- SHAIKH HAMAD REPEATEDLY STRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT REPORT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE OFFER OR AGREEMENT TO SELL ANY OF EQUIPMENT WHICH REPORT MAY RECOMMEND. SHAIKH HAMAD REPEATED HIS REQUEST, INITIALLY MADE DURING DEPSECDEF CLEMENTS' VISIT, FOR US HELP WITH MAINTAINING FLYING PROFICIENCY OF HIS FEW TRAINED PILOTS AND ALSO REQUESTED THAT US SUPPLY TEAM TO ADVISE ON-SITE SELECTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF AIR AND NAVAL BASES. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAMA 02022 01 OF 02 021451Z

2. SHAIKH HAMAD FOLLOWED SURVEY VERY CLOSELY, OCCASIONALLY JOINING

TEAM'S WORKING SESSION. PERHAPS BECAUSE TEAM MEMBERS WERE VERY SENSITIVE TO POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF F-5'S, RED EYE AND MISSILE BOATS, AND THEREFORE PERHAPS OVERLY COY IN DISCUSSING THESE ITEMS, SHAIKH HAMAD APPARENTLY BECAME FEARFUL THAT TEAM'S REPORT WOULD REFLECT THESE

POLICY CONCERNS, "POLITICS", RATHER THAN PURELY PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT

OF MILITARY EXPERTS. HE WAS VERY CANDID IN EXPRESSING THIS FEAR TO TEAM DURING EXIT BRIEFING AND TO AMBASSADOR DURING FAREWELL CALL. SHAIKH HAMAD REPEATEDLY STRESSED TO AMBASSADOR THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT USG MAY NOT AGREE TO SELL SOME TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WHICH REPORT MAY RECOMMEND. NOTING AS WELL THAT SOME OF THESE ITEMS MAY BE BEYOND GOB'S FUNANCIAL CAPABILITIES, HE EMPHASIZED -- ALMOST PLEADINGLY -- HIS NEED FOR REPORT WHICH HE CAN USE WITH HIS OFFICERS, THE CABINET, AND POTENTIAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS (READ SAUDIS) TO BDF EXPANSION PLANS. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID HE NEEDS URGENTLY REPORT WHICH WILL BE BLUEPRINT FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF BDF, REGARDLESS OF SOURCE OF EQUIPMENT. HE SAID HE IS RELYING ON US OFFICERS TO SEND HIM

REPORT WHICH HE CAN USE BOTH TO PRESENT TO CABINET AS FUTURE COURSE WHICH BDF SHOULD FOLLOW AND AS DOCUMENT WHICH WILL GIVE HIS OFFICERS AND MEN GOALS TOWARD WHICH THEY CAN WORK AND PLAN.

3. WHILE TEAM IN EXIT BRIEFING QUITE PROPERLY DID NOT GET INTO SPECIFICS OF RECOMMENDATIONS IT WILL MAKE, THERE HAD BEEN ENOUGH CANDID EXCHANGES BETWEEN US AND BDF OFFICERS FOR LATTER GAIN IMPRESSION THAT TEAM IS LEANING TOWARD RECOMMENDING AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL CRAFT OF LESS SOPHISTICATION THAN BDF FEELS IT NEEDS AND, OF COURSE, WANTS. SHAIKH HAMAD ADDRESSED THIS POINT WITH TEAM AND WITH AMBASSADOR IN TERMS OF HIS BEING PREPARED ACCEPT IN REPORT CONCEPT OF INTERIM AIRCRAFT (LESS THAT F-5'S) AND VESSELS (LESS THAN 100 FEET) PROVIDED IT WOULD BE CLEAR AS WELL IN REPORT AND AT OUTSET OF ANY CONTRACT TALKS THAT INTERIM EQUIPMENT IS MEANT TO BE PRELIMINARY

TO ACQUISITION OF MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT OF SPECIFIC TYPE(READ F-5'S AND MISSILE BOATS) AT SPECIFIED FUTURE TIME. OTHERWISE, ACCORDING

TO SHAIKH HAMAD, CONCEPT OF INTERIM EQUIPMENT COULD NOT BE SOLD TO CABINET OR TO THOSE WHO MIGHT HELP IN FINANCING, AND WOULD BE "DANGEROUSLY" DISAPPOINTING TO BDF OFFICERS AND MEN. NEITHER SHAIKH CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MANAMA 02022 01 OF 02 021451Z

HAMAD NOR HIS STAFF SHOWED ANY GREAT INTEREST IN GROUND FORCES. REGARDING AIR DEFENSE, HE AND HIS OFFICERS CLEARLY HOPE FOR RECOMMEND AT- IONS FOR SOMETHING MORE THAT VULCAN BUT IN EXIT BRIEFING AND FAREWELL CALL THEY DID NOT GIVE THIS AS MUCH EMPHASIS AS AIR WING AND NAVY RECEIVED. WHILE TEAM'S DETAILED REPORTS WILL BE BEST GUIDE, AMBASSADOR GAINED IMPRESSION DURING FAREWELL MEETING THAT SHAIKH HAMAD AND HIS

COS, COL. KHALIFA, MAY BE BETTER PREPARED TO ACCEPT VULCAN AS AIR DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION, AT LEAST AS ACCEPTABLE BEGINNING, THAN THEY ARE TO ACCEPT AIR AND NAVY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN F-5'S AND LARGER NAVAL CRAFT.

4. REGARDING REGIONAL DEFENSE, SHAIKH HAMAD CONTINUED TO STRESS BAHRAIN'S NEED TO BE ABLE TO DO ITS SHARE WHILE, AT SAME TIME, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT BAHRAIN SHOULD NOT BE IN POSITION OF RELYING SOLELY ON ITS NEIGHBORS FOR DEFENSE. HE AND HIS OFFICERS MISS NO OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE BAHRAIN'S LACK OF MODERN EQUIPMENT WITH RECENT AND PLANNED ACQUISITIONS OF ITS NEIGHBORS, WITH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT BEING AN OFT-CITED EXAMPLE. SHAIKH HAMAD'S WISH TO STANDARDIZE ON US EQUIPMENT WAS CONSTANT THEME AS WAS HIS PORTRAYAL OF OTHER SIDE OF EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION COIN -- FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN OFFERS "BY THE DOZEN" BEING LEFT UNANSWERED UNTIL BAHRAIN'S AMERICAN FRIENDS RENDER A VERDICT. IN CONTEXT OF REGIONAL DEFENSE, SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT BOTH SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS ANXIOUS FOR BAHRAIN TO BUILD ITS AIR BASE BECAUSE IT WOULD PROVIDE DEFENDED, LOGISTICALLY COMPETENT SITE TO WHICH SAUDI AND KUWAITI AIRCRAFT COULD DIVERT OR DISPERSE IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY OR TENSION. SHAIKH HAMAD STRESSED BAHRAIN'S DESIRE TO BE ABLE BOTH TO RECEIVE AREA MILITARY UNITS OR PERSONNEL ON ITS SOIL IN RESPECTABLE MANNER AND TO SEND "PROPER" UNITS TO NEARBY COUNTRIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MANAMA 02022 02 OF 02 021454Z

44

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 085412

R 020837Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 3903
INFO JCS WASHINGTON DC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
COMIDEASTFOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA SECTION 2 OF 2 2022/2

EXDIS (MILITARY ADDRESSES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR)

REF : MANAMA 1973

IN EVENT OF POLITICAL OR MILITARY NEED.

5. THOUGH WE HAD HEARD RELATIVELY LITTLE OF IT BEFORE TEAM ARRIVED, SHAIKH HAMAD AND HIS OFFICERS GAVE CONSIDERABLE STRESS TO NEED FOR BDF TO BEGIN NOW THE PLANNING AND CONTRACTING FOR ITS NAVAL BASE AND ITS AIR BASE. SHAIKH HAMAD ASKED TEAM LEADER AND AMBASSADOR FOR USG TEAM TO DO SITE SURVEYS AND CONSTRUCTION ADVICE/ESTIMATES FOR THESE TWO BASES. HIS ROUGH TIMETABLE FOR THESE PROJECTS, AND FOR EQUIPMENT HE PLANS FOR THEM TO ACCOMMODATE, IS 1977 FOR GETTING STARTED ON THE BASES, 1977 FOR GETTING GOB APPROVAL AND FUNDING FOR EQUIPMENT, 1978 FOR FIRST EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES, AND 1978-1982 FOR MESHING BASE COMPLETIONS AND FULL EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES. TEAM'S JUDGMENT THAT BDF BASES AND FACILITIES ARE BEHIND SCHEDULE IN TERM BDF'S OWN PLANS (THOUGH TRAINING IS JUDGED TO BE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE) REINFORCED SHAIKH HAMAD'S DESIRE -- AND MAY HAVE PROVOKED HIS REQUEST TO AMBASSADOR FOR ENGINEER TEAM TO DO BASE SURVEY -- FOR AN EARLY START ON CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES.

6. AMBASSADOR AND TEAM LEADER STRESSED TO SHAIKH HAMAD THAT, AS AMBASSADOR HAD POINTED OUT EARLIER, TEAM WOULD MAKE TOTALLY PROFESSIONAL, NON-POLITICAL JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH, AS HAD ALSO BEEN MADE CLEAR EARLIER, WOULD NOT BIND USG IN TERMS OF OFFE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MANAMA 02022 02 OF 02 021454Z

R
OR AGREEMENT TO SELL. TEAM'S REPORT WOULD BE USEFUL TOOL FOR BDF PLANNING, REGARDLESS OF WHAT USG'S POLICY RESPONSES TO ITS PROFESSIONAL
AL
RECOMMENDATIONS MIGHT BE. REGARDING TIMING OF REPORT, TEAM LEADER TOLD SHAIKH HAMAD OF DECEMBER 20 DRAFTING DEADLINE AND BOTH HE AND AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT RELEASE OF REPORT TO GOB WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AFTER THAT DATE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW TRANSITION TO NEW US ADMINISTRATION. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID HE HOPED HE COULD HAVE IT IN HAND BEFORE PLANNED JANUARY TRIP TO FRANCE BUT HE RECEIVED NO ENCOURAGEMENT ON THIS SCORE.

7. SHAIKH HAMAD EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT HIS SMALL BUT GROWING CADRE OF TRAINED BUT EQUIPMENT-LESS PILOTS AND TECHNICIANS. HE FELT THAT THESE MEN, AS WELL AS REST OF BDF, WOULD BECOME DANGER TO REGIME IF THERE CONTINUES TO BE NO PROSPECT FOR "RESPECTABILITY" IN
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT. IN THIS REGARD, SHAIKH HAMAD REPEATED REQUEST HE MADE ORIGINALLY TO CLEMENTS' PARTY THAT US FIND WAY TO HELP HIS FEW PILOTS MAINTAIN THEIR PROFICIENCY. TEAM LEADER UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO STATUS OF THIS REQUEST IN WASHINGTON.

8. COMMENT. SURVEY TEAM'S REPORT SHOULD, OF COURSE, REFLECT ONLY PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JUDGMENTS, AND SHOULD BE BROAD ENOUGH IN SCOPE

TO PROVIDE BDF WITH PLANNING DOCUMENT SHAIKH HAMAD EXPECTS. IT WOULD
BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IF REPORT COULD INCLUDE LIFE-CYCLE COST
ESTIMATES, HOWEVER CAVEATED IN TERMS FUTURE INFLATION, ETC., FOR
EACH TYPE OF EQUIPMENT DISCUSSED AND/OR RECOMMENDED. (WE SUSPECT
THAT AT LEAST ONE MANUFACTURER ALREADY HAS GIVEN BDF COST FIGURES
WHICH ARE MISLEADINGLY LOW.) TIMING OF RELEASE OF REPORT TO GOB
OBVIOUSLY A FUNCTION OF DRAFTING, REVIEW, AND CLEARANCE PROCESS IN
WASHINGTON BUT, WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT REPORT IS NOT OFFER OR
AGREEMENT TO SELL, IT PROBABLY WOULD BE HELPFUL TO OUR OTHER INTEREST
S
HERE TO GET REPORT INTO SHAIKH HAMAD'S HANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

CLUVERIUS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SURVEYS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: morefirh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MANAMA02022
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760446-0491
From: MANAMA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761279/aaaacqlw.tel
Line Count: 235
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 76 MANAMA 1973
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: morefirh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 JAN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 JAN 2004 by morefirh>; APPROVED <07 Jan 2004 by morefirh>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM: DEFENSE MINISTER'S VIEWS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, MARR, BA, (HAMAD, SHAIKH)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006